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SANTA CLARA LAWYER
BANKRUPTCY: DUE SCHEDULING - SUFFICIENCY OF SCHEDULING CREDITOR'S
NAME AND ADDRESS IN A BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING - NOnCE TO THE
CREDITOR.
Section 17(a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act' provides that "A discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts . . .
except such as . . . have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and
allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless
such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings." Section
7(a) (8) of the Act 2 further provides that "The bankrupt shall prepare ...
a list of all his creditors,... showing their residences or places of business,
if known, or if unknown that fact to be stated. .. "
Under the former bankruptcy act, a debt, inadvertently omitted from
the schedule, with no fraudulent intention on the part of the bankrupt, was
barred by a discharge, although the creditor received no notice of the
proceedings.3
In determining whether any of the defects of the former act were in-
tended to be remedied by Congress in enacting the present act, the court in
Tyrrel v. Hammerstein found:
The change most clearly indicated is that, where the creditor has
neither knowledge nor notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, his debt,
if not duly scheduled, with his name, if known to the bankrupt, is not
to be discharged, whether the omission is fraudulent or otherwise. This
would seem to be the application by Congress to bankruptcy proceed-
ings of the familiar constitutional principle that the "due process of
law" intended to deprive one of property contemplates notice of some
kind to the party whose property is to be taken that he may have his
day in court.4
Hence, if the indebtedness is duly scheduled, the failure of the creditor to
be served with notice of the bankruptcy proceedings does not affect the dis-
charge of the bankrupt from the debt,5 and where such provable debt is not
duly scheduled, it is not discharged, despite the fact that the debt is un-
known to the bankrupt. 6
The apparent weight of authority finds that a due scheduling of a prov-
able debt includes (1) the correct name of the creditor, if known, and
S11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (3).
11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (8).
Lamb v. Brown, 14 Fed. Cas. 988 (No. 8,011) (D. C. Ind. 1875).
33 Misc. 505, 507, 67 N. Y. Supp. 717, 719 (1900).
SSline v. Layden, 91 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1901).
0 Santa Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 73 Pac. 577 (1903).
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(2) the residence or place of business of the creditor, if known, and if not
known, a statement to that effect. 7 In ascertaining to what extent, in general,
the aforementioned elements must be met by the bankrupt in order that a
debt be duly scheduled, the court in King v. Harry reasoned as follows:
A discharge in bankruptcy is a privilege. It is not a one-way street.
The bankrupt has certain obligations to fulfill and his creditors, already
losers, are at least entitled to notice before their property is taken,
in the absence of some good and sufficient explanation to the contrary.
For this reason, and for the reason that the sections of the Act requiring
correct scheduling are for the benefit of the creditors and not the
debtor, a bankrupt must exercise great care to schedule his assets
and names and addresses of his creditors properly.
At the same time the thrust of the Act is to aid one who has fallen
upon hard time so that small technicalities and mere irregularities in
the schedules should not be determinative in barring a discharge. It is
too much to ask that the bankrupt be held to insure the absolute
accuracy of the schedule. A schedule which lists a creditor's address,
even though incorrectly stated, is prima facie sufficient for the purpose
of a discharge and the creditor has the burden to show that his particular
debt should not be discharged, although the very presence of factual
error is enough to put the bankrupt to his defense to show to the court
what efforts he made to assure its accuracy.
Satisfactory performance must depend upon the particular facts of
each case. No fixed rule of law can be laid down as the unyielding
standard of adequate compliance.8
Specifically, where a bankrupt schedules the wrong name when he knows
or should know the proper name, the debt will not be duly scheduled.9 Yet
without resorting to extrinsic circumstances, the courts are generally unable
to determine the question of whether a name is duly scheduled. In Sline v.
Hayden,10 it was suggested that all the bankrupt has to do is to give all the
information in his possession as to the name of the creditor and the debt,
and if the information describes the debt so that the creditor could recognize
it, the debt would be duly scheduled. In Broderick v. Adamson," it was held
that the Bankruptcy Act does not require the impossible, but provides for
the listing of the names of creditors "if known to the bankrupt" and not
otherwise; therefore, the failure to state names of unknown creditors does
not impair the efficacy of the discharge. Similarly, the court in Morency v.
Landry'2 found that the provision requiring the scheduling of the names
'McGhee v. Brookins, 140 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
8 131 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D.C.D.C. 1955).
9Columbia Bank v. Birkett, 174 N.Y. 112, 66 N.E. 652, afi'd, 195 U.S. 345 (1903);
Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1922); In re Skrentny, 199 F.2d 488 (C.A. II. 1952).
10 Supra, n. 5.
11 240 App. Div. 229, 268 N.Y. Supp. 766 (1934).
12 79 N.H. 305, 108 Atl. 855 (1919).
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of creditors "if known," plainly implies that one who becomes a creditor
without the knowledge of the bankrupt cannot complain because the claim
is not scheduled as owing to him. The foregoing cases involved the proper
scheduling of the name of the original creditor and the failure to schedule
the name of the assignee of that creditor due to the fact that the bankrupt
had no notice of the assignment.13
In other cases which have upheld the irregular scheduling of the name
of a creditor, the name as scheduled is generally sufficient to designate the
person to whom the debt is owed. The scheduling of the name, "Fred
Schill & Co.," for a creditor properly named, Frederick Schill & Co., was
deemed to be "an unimportant and insignificant deviation from the precise
corporate name," and the scheduling was sufficient.14 In holding that
"C. Ferger" was proper scheduling of the name of the creditor, Charles
Ferger, the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
The difficulty grows out of the impossibility of applying a general and
uniform rule where there are so many varying methods by which men's
names and residences are designated. Some men have a well-known and
constantly used Christian name; others by initials for the Christian name;
others are known by nickname....
The Bankruptcy Act fails to prescribe which form of designation
shall be used in listing creditors in the schedule .... In many instances,
the only knowledge the debtor has as to the name of his creditor is
derived from signatures, letterheads, drafts, and like instruments in
which the name of the creditor may be designated by initials, or by
abbreviation, or by full Christian name. To say that the use of an initial
in listing a creditor was improper when the creditor himself has con-
stantly received letters addressed to him in that manner, would not
only ignore a common business practice, but would, in many instances,
work a great hardship. 15
The scheduling of the creditor with the name by which he is commonly
known was sufficient.' 6 The omission of the word "trustee" does not render
the discharge ineffective, since it is not a part of the name of the creditor,
but merely is descriptio personae.'" Therefore, when an irregular scheduling
of a creditor's name is upheld, it must be of such a nature as not to connote
a different name from that of the creditor.
18 Morency v. Landry, supra, n. 12; Broderick v. Adamson, 240 App. Div. 229, 268 N.Y.
Supp. 766 (1934); Union Trust Co. v. Rosenstein, 51 N.Y.S.2d 396 (City Ct. N.Y. 1944).
11 Frederick Schill & Co. v. Larsen, 135 N.J.L. 335, 50 A.2d 850; aff'd, 136 N.J.L. 197,
54 A.2d 732 (1947).
15 Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21, 28, 29 (1915); see also, Claflin v. Wolff, 8 N.J.L.
308, 96 Atl. 73 (1915).
"- Sline v. Layden, 91 S.W.2d 983 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); contra, Cohen v. Pinkus, 126
App. Div. 792, 111 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1908).
"' Levine v. Katz, 293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466 (1940).
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Great care should be exercised when scheduling the name of the
creditor, since a minor error could change a name as to make it a different
name, and if that did occur, the scheduling would be inadequate. Illustrative
examples of improper scheduling are as follows: A. Custard scheduled as
A. Castard; 18 George Liesum scheduled as George Liesman; 19 Jacob Ringle
& Son scheduled as Jacob Ringler & Son;20 W. G. Ingram scheduled as L. E.
Ingram; 21 Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Company scheduled as Dalton
& Bell Co.; 22 and Swen Morrine scheduled as Swan Morrise. 23 Where there
is a considerable error in the scheduling of the name of the creditor, the
fact that the name or the identity of the creditor could be reasonably de-
duced from all of the information scheduled would not constitute adequate
scheduling. 24
When it is shown that the bankrupt knew or should have known a more
complete name than the abbreviated form scheduled by him, the debt will
not be duly scheduled.
25
Unlike the scheduling of the creditor's name, the Bankruptcy Act does
provide that the address of the creditor - residence or place of business -
can be scheduled as unknown if it is unknown. 26 A bankrupt cannot schedule
that a creditor's address is unknown if it is known to him, and he must also
make a reasonable effort to ascertain the address, if such address is unknown.
If after making a reasonable effort, the address is still unknown, the address
of the creditor may be properly scheduled as "unknown," 27 but where the
address should have been known or could have been ascertained, the address
cannot be duly scheduled as "unknown."
2 8
11 Custard v. Wigderson, 130 Wisc. 412, 110 N.W. 263 (1907).
19Liesum v. Kraus, 35 Misc. 376, 71 N.Y. Supp. 1022 (1901), improper scheduling
allegedly caused by clerical error.
20 Grosso v. Marx, 45 Misc. 50, 92 N.Y. Supp. 773 (1904).
-' Ingram v. Carruthers, 194 Tenn. 290, 250 S.W.2d 537 (1952).
52 Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co. v. Sanders, 142 Mo.App. 50, 125 S.W. 517 (1910).
22 Armstrong v. Sweeney, 73 Neb. 775, 103 N.W. 436 (1905).
21 Tyler v. Jones County Bank, 78 Ga.App. 741, 52 S.E.2d 547 (1949), wherein the
Jones County Bank which was the only bank in Haddock, Georgia, was scheduled as Had-
dock Bank, Haddock, Georgia.
25 Hunter v. Hall, 60 Ga.App. 69, 4 S.E.2d 69 (1939), wherein "et al." was used to
identify other joint creditors in executing and recording the judgment, but when used to
schedule the names of the other joint creditors, the debt was not duly scheduled since the
bankrupt should have known their names. Bartlett v. Taylor, 209 Mo.App. 612, 238 S.W.
141 (1922), wherein, the bankrupt failed to schedule the creditor's middle initial when
it was shown that the bankrupt should have known it.
20 Supra, notes 1 and 2.
27 Lutz v. Kalmus, 115 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Sup.App.T. 1909); In re Mollner, 75 App. Div.
441, 78 N.Y. Supp. 281 (1902).
" Miller v. Guasti, 226 U.S. 170 (1912); Union Trust Co. v. Rosenstein, 51 N.Y.S.2d 396
(City Ct. N.Y. 1944); Marlenee v. Warkentin, 71 Cal.App.2d 177, 162 P.2d 321 (1945).
19621
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
It is well settled that a debt is not duly scheduled if the bankrupt has
listed the creditor's address incorrectly.29 Due scheduling has been denied
where the exact street address but the wrong city and state were listed,80
and where the correct city and state were listed but the wrong local address
was given.8 1
The omission of the local street address where the correct city and state
are scheduled has been held not to vitiate due scheduling. 2 The United
States Supreme Court has reasoned:
As to . .. omissions of street address the Act must be given a general
construction and in the light of the fact that letters directed to persons
. . . are constantly, properly, and promptly delivered in the greatest
cities of the country even when the street number is not given. When it
is considered that the schedule must not only include claims of recent
origin but debts which have accrued many years before and where the
creditor may have changed his residence, it becomes evident that to lay
down the general rule that the schedule must give the name of the
creditor and the city and street number of the residence of those living
in the largest cities would, in the mulitude of cases destroy the beneficent
effect of the Bankruptcy Act.88
The bankrupt must show that he exercised diligence in attempting to ascer-
tain the information which was omitted from the scheduling of the address,
or the debt will not be considered to be duly scheduled. When a bankrupt
omits only the street number of the address, but he could have easily ob-
tained such information either by consulting the local telephone directory
or inquiring of the creditor's attorney, the scheduling of the address without
the street number will not be proper.8 4 The fact that the bankrupt and the
creditor corresponded with each other and had mutual acquaintances, the
bankrupt could not validly schedule the address of the creditor by merely
listing the city and state, but must also list the street address.8 5
In the case of a judgment creditor, the scheduling of the address of the
attorney who represented the creditor is not sufficient to meet the require-
2 Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Cal.2d 217, 120 P.2d 20 (1941); Solomon v. Sarno,
365 App. Div. 114, 37 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1942). See Annotations, Sufficiency of scheduling of
creditor's residence or address in bankruptcy proceeding, and presumptions and burden of
proof in connection therewith, 68 A.L.R.2d 955 (1959).
30 Westheimer v. Howard, 47 Misc. 145, 93 N.Y. Supp. 518 (1905).
Al Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Cal.2d 217, 120 P.2d 20 (1941).
8 Dill v. Hamilton, 73 Cal.App.2d 881, 167 P.2d 497 (1946); Freeman v. Cooper, 126
N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609 (1941); Claflin v. Wolff, 8 N.J.L. 308, 96 At. 73 (1915).
83 Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21 (1915).
8, Cogliostro v. Indelli, 53 Misc. 44, 102 N.Y. Supp. 918 (1907).
81 Bartlett v. Taylor, 209 Mo.App. 612, 238 S.W. 141 (1922).
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ments of the Act.36 But as it is in most cases after the passing of several
years, the address of the attorney can be more easily ascertained than that
of the creditor; the scheduling of the address of the attorney for informa-
tional purposes has been allowed where the creditor's address is stated to
be unknown.3 7
The use of abbreviated forms in scheduling the address has been allowed
where the abbreviation is of common usage, for example: N.J. for New
Jersey,88 and N.Y. City for New York City.8 9 In regards to the use of ditto
marks to indicate a creditor's address, it was remarked that the resort to
ditto marks is in violation of both the letter and spirit of the Act, as well as
the General Order No. 5 (89 Fed. V, 32 CCA VIII) which directs all sched-
ules to be printed or written out plainly, without abbreviations.40 The
scheduling of an address as "135 Bway," which was intended to designate
135 Broadway, was said not to be a sufficient designation of any address
and was "in plain violation" of General Order No. 5.41
All authorities hold that a proper scheduling is constructive notice to the
creditor. 42 Where proper scheduling is lacking, there will be no discharge of
the debt "unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceed-
ings."48 In the expression "notice or actual knowledge," the latter term is
used to explain the former; therefore, it is clear that actual knowledge is
required in order to exclude the creditor. 44 In a case where the creditor
obtained actual notice two months after the discharge in bankruptcy, the
United States Supreme Court held that the actual knowledge of the proceed-
ings contemplated by the section is a knowledge in time to avail a creditor
of the benefits of the law - in time to give him an equal opportunity with
other creditors - not a knowledge that may come so late as to deprive him
of participation in the administration of the affairs of the estate or to deprive
him of its dividends. 45 Actual knowledge has been held to be imputable
under agency principles as in the case where an attorney attains notice who
8' Stokes v. Elgart, 43 N.Y.S.2d 205 (City Ct. N.Y. 1943); Continental Purchasing Co.
v. Norelli, 135 N.J.L. 93, 48 A.2d 816 (1946); Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Cal.2d
217, 120 P.2d 20 (1941).
87 Shire v. Bornstein, 4 App. Div. 2d 74, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1957); compare, Wyser v.
Estrin, 285 App. Div. 827, 136 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1955).
88 Freeman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609 (1941).
81 Claflin v. Wolff, 8 N.J.L. 308, 96 Ati. 73 (1915).
'0 Haack v. Theise, 51 Misc. 3, 99 N.Y. Supp. 905 (1906).
1 Sutherland v. Lasher, 41 Misc. 249, 84 N.Y. Supp. 56, af'd, 87 App. Div. 633, 84
N.Y. Supp. 1148 (1903).
41 Dill v. Hamilton, 73 Cal.App.2d 881, 167 P.2d 497 (1946).
11 U.S.C. § 35 (a) (3).
"Santa Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 73 Pac. 577 (1903).
'5 Columbia Bank v. Birkett, 174 N.Y. 112, 66 N.E. 652; aff'd, 195 U.S. 345 (1903).
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has been engaged to collect the debt by the creditor.46 The notice to a
cashier of a creditor bank who had discussed the fact of the bankruptcy
proceedings with others was imputed to the employer.47 But notice to an
attorney when he is not serving a judgment creditor, although the attorney
may have represented the creditor in the suit in which the debt arose, is
not imputed to the creditor.48 Therefore, it appears that constructive notice
of the creditor may be obtained only by due scheduling of the debt; other-
wise, the creditor must have actual knowledge which may be imputed to
him under certain circumstances.
Grayson S. Taketa
* Third year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
46 American Southern Trust Co. v. Vester, 189 Ark. 9, 34 S.W.2d 747 (1931); Keefauver
v. Hevenor, 163 App. Div. 531, 148 N.Y. Supp. 434 (1914).
47 Bank of Wrightsville v. Four Seasons, 21 Ga.App. 453, 94 S.E. 649 (1917).
48 Continental Purchasing Co. v. Norelli, 135 N.J.L. 93, 48 A.2d 816 (1946).
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